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GUILTY PLEAS
Plea Baigaining. There is no constitutional right to plea bargain. t 9 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court recognizes plea bargaining as an essential component
of the criminal justice system 1 "' and the Constitution requires a prosecutor to
comply with equal protection requirements in conducting plea bargaining. 3 "
Rule 11 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the conduct of
the government and the defendant"1 '2 during plea negotiations.' 1 ' Rule
1309. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977): see also Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2d
1287, 1294 (5th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor has discretion to enter plea bargains with some defendants
and not others), petition for ceri. filed. Dec. 7, 1993; Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 450-51 (9th
Cir. 1988) (state not obligated to accept defendant's offer to plea bargain), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
944 (1989). Cf. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984) (plea bargain merely contract; only
guilty plea and subsequent deprivation implicate Constitution); U.S. v Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129,
1134 (3d Cir. 1990) (prosecutor may condition plea bargain on codefendants accepting guilty plea
package without violating due process when defendant retained right to jury trial because
prosecutor under no duty to bargain), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 (1991).
1310. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
1311. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357. 364 (1978) (prosecutor's decision to offer plea
bargain may not be "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification" (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448. 456 (1962))). Cf. U.S. v.
Bernal-Rojas, 933 F.2d 97, 99 (Ist Cir. 1991) (although evidence of systematic failure of U.S.
Attorney to plea bargain with Colombian nationals may establish prima facie equal protection
claim, defendant's meager, unsubstantiated claim "woefully" short of demonstrating constitu-
tional violation). Compare U.S. v. Sustaita, I F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant failed to
sustain claim of impermissibly selective prosecution when he could not demonstrate he was
selected for prosecution rather than plea arrangement on the basis of an impermissible ground
such as race, religion, or exercise of constitutional rights) vith U.S. v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d
1296, 1301-03 (9th Cir. 1992) (where prima facie evidence shows that prosecutor's plea bargain-
ing had discriminatory impact and court determines prosecutor motivated by discriminatory
purpose. giving defendant benefit of bargain she would have received absent discrimination is
appropriate remedy).
1312. The court is prohibited from participating in plea negotiations. FED. R. CRIM. P.
I I (e)(1), see U.S. v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830), 835-42 (5th Cir. 1981) (judge's impermissible interven-
tion entitled defendant to resentencing by different judge because judicial participation in plea
negotiations so inherently dangerous that appellate court will raise issue sua sponte and order
appropriate remedy): U.S. v. Barrett. 982 F.2d 193. 195 (6th Cir. 1992) (judge impermissibly
intervened when he stated it was his opinion that defendant had no case and that he was
unsurprised the investigator had not located any alibi witnesses): U.S. v. Anderson. 993 F.2d
1435, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1993) (judge impermissibly intervened when he threatened to forbid
government to accept plea to fewer than all 30 counts: rule I I proscribes any court participation
in plea bargaining discussions regardless of whether prejudice shown): U.S. v. Corbitt. 996 F.2d
1132, 1135 (11 th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (judge impermissibly intervened by stating during plea
negotiations that defendant and codefendants would receive "fairly high" sentence if they went
to trial and were found guilty). Nevertheless, this prohibition may not be absolute. See U.S. v.
Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1990) (absent showing of fraud, district court prohibited from
modifying plea agreement after unconditionally accepting it).
1313. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(e). Once negotiations end and a plea contract is formed, rule II
safeguards no longer apply. U.S. v. Knight, 867 F.2d 1285, 1288 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
846 (1989). When discussions do not constitute plea bargaining, rule II does not apply. See U.S.
v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 421 (3d Cir. 1985) (statements made to person defendant could not
have reasonably believed authorized to plea bargain not inadmissible under rule I l(e)). cert.
denied. 484 U.S. 1017 (1988); U.S. v. Jorgensen. 871 F.2d 725, 73(1 (8th Cir. 1989) (statements
made to officers at FBI offices when defendant not in custody not part of plea bargaining and thus
not inadmissible under rule I l(e)).
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11 (e)(1) authorizes plea agreements under which a defendant pleads guilty to
the charged offense or to a lesser or related offense.'" 4 In such an agreement,
the prosecutor may move for dismissal of other charges, 3 '5 make a non-
binding sentencing recommendation to the court, 3 "6 agree not to oppose the
defendant's request for a particular sentence, 31 7 or agree that a specific
sentence is appropriate for the disposition of the case.""1 8 Typically, the
government is required only to abide by the specific terms of the agreement; it
need not "enthusiastically" defend its sentencing recommendations." 9 Al-
1314. FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(e)(1).
1315. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(I)(A).
1316. FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(e)(l)(B).
1317. Id.
1318. FED. R. CRIM. P. II(e)(i)(C).
1319. U.S. v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455-56 (1985) (per curiam). Compare U.S. v. Ramos,
810 F.2d 308, 313-14 (1st Cir. 1987) (government's promise to recommend light sentence not
breached by prosecutor's negative comments on sentencing report because no obligation to
advocate recommended sentence enthusiastically); U.S. v. Miller, 993 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1993)
(government's promise not to oppose defendant's motion for downward departure from sentenc-
ing guidelines did not bar government from making a motion to depart upward); U.S. v.
Huddleston, 929 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1991) (government's promise to recommend particular
sentence not breached when prosecutor made recommendation but also discussed dangerousness
of defendant's activities) and U.S. v. Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356, 363-64 (10th Cir.) (government's
promise to recommend specific sentence not breached when prosecutor made recommendation
but discussed defendant's dissemination of grand jury materials), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164
(1991) with U.S. v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263,. 269-71 (1st Cir. 1992) (government's promise to
recommend specific sentence breached when prosecutor paid "lip service" to plea agreement but
recommended "lengthy" sentence instead of affirmatively recommending sentence specified in
plea agreement). Cf. Raulerson v. U.S., 901 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir. 1990) (plea agreement
which required government to tell other federal courts of defendant's cooperation did not
preclude government from opposing sentences proposed in those other courts).
In cases in which the government agrees not to recommend a specific sentence, courts generally
do not preclude the government from making additional recommendations for punishment as
long as the government does not recommend a specific sentence. Compare U.S. v. Weinberg, 852
F.2d 681, 687-88 (2d Cir. 1988) (government did not breach agreement not to make specific
sentence recommendation at sentencing hearing by vividly describing offenses). U.S. v. Moore,
931 F.2d 245, 250 (4th Cir. 1991) (government did not breach agreement to refrain from
recommending specific sentence by making remarks calculated to induce court to issue severe
sentence), cert. denied. 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991); U.S. v. Brummett. 786 F.2d 720. 722-23 (6th Cir.
1986) (government did not breach agreement not to recommend particular sentence by recom-
mending -lengthy" sentence); U.S. v. White. 724 F.2d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(government did not breach agreement not to recommend sentence by opposing defendant's
motion to reduce sentence): U.S. v. Clark, 781 F.2d 730, 731-33 (9th Cir. 1986) (government did
not breach agreement not to recommend particular sentence by recommending that defendant
serve longest possible sentence) and U.S. v. Carrazana, 921 F.2d 1557, 1569 (11th Cir.) (govern-
ment did not breach agreement not to recommend particular sentence by referring to defendant
as drug "kingpin" in response to defense counsel's sentencing recommendation), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 191 (1991) with U.S. v. Moscahlaidis. 868 F.2d 1357, 1361-63 (3d Cir. 1989) (government
breached agreement not to take position regarding imposition of custodial sentence by offering
opinions and drawing conclusions about defendant's character in sentencing memorandum);
Brunelle v. U.S., 864 F.2d 64, 65 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (government breached agreement
to recommend only unspecified period of incarceration by recommending maximum sentence)
and U.S. v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985, 988 (11 th Cir. 1992) (government breached agreement through
its memorandum to sentencing court emphasizing defendant's refusal to cooperate and his past
involvement with criminals, thereby suggesting harsh sentence, when in agreement government
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though plea agreements entered into by one are generally not binding on other
jurisdictions in state prosecutions, 32' a plea entered into by a federal prosecu-
tor is binding in all federal districts.' 3 2'
A plea agreement is usually treated as a contract;' 322 thus, it may be
explicitly acknowledged defendant did not have to cooperate and agreed not to recommend any
sentence other than downward departure).
1320. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87 (1985) (plea agreement limiting sentence to life in
prison in one state did not preclude other state from imposing death penalty).
Generally, a plea agreement does not bind governmental bodies in the same jurisdiction if they
are not parties to the agreement. See U.S. v. Williamsburg Check Cashing Corp., 905 F.2d 25, 28
(2d Cir. 1990) (plea agreement not to recommend sentence did not preclude all government
sources from giving probation department factual evidence on defendants); Augustine v. Brewer,
821 F.2d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1987) (plea agreement did not preclude parole commission from
considering Counts in indictment dropped by prosecution); Merki v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 599, 601
(8th Cir. 1988) (plea agreement to specify to parole commission only crimes in which defendant
had personal role did not preclude parole commission from independently considering defendant's
association with paramilitary organization); U.S. v. Fitzhugh, 801 F.2d 1432, 1434-35 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (plea agreement not to seek revocation of certain licenses held by defendant physician did
not preclude DEA from revoking license).
The federal government is not bound by plea agreements made by state prosecutors. See U.S. v.
Sandate, 630 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1980) (plea agreement with state government did not
preclude federal government from prosecuting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); Meagher v.
Clark, 943 F.2d 1277, 1281 (11 th Cir. 1991) (plea agreement with state prosecutor for concurrent
sentences not binding on federal prosecutors because dual sovereignty prevents court from
providing defendant with relief).
1321. U.S. v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 302-03 (4th Cir. 1986) (promise by federal prosecutor to
bring no further charges binding on all federal courts).
1322. U.S. v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613-14 (6th Cir. 1991) (plea agreements contractual in
nature, interpreted and enforced pursuant to traditional contract law principles); U.S. v. Ingram,
979 F.2d 1179, 1184 (7th Cir. 1992) (plea agreements are contracts; their content and meaning
are determined according to standard contract principles), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1616 (1993);
U.S. v. Lewis, 979 F.2d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir. 1992) (plea bargain is governed by contract principles
(citing U.S. v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990))); see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262
(because promise by prosecutor part of "consideration" for guilty plea, government must fulfill
agreement); U.S. v. Atwood, 963 F.2d 476, 479 (Ist Cir. 1992) (because agreement required
defendant to request that prosecutor tell court about cooperation, no remedy when defendant
failed to make necessary request); U.S. v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of S228,536.00, 895 F.2d
908, 914 (2d Cir.) (because defendant failed to record alleged government promise not to forfeit
currency, promise was not enforceable), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 958 (1990); U.S. v. Fentress, 792
F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 1986) (because written plea agreement serves as "complete and exclusive"
statement of terms of agreement, when agreement did not establish limits on prosecutor's
recommendation of sanction, no breach when prosecutor recommended restitution and consecu-
tive sentences); Warner v. U.S. 975 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (6th Cir. 1992) (because would violate
established contract law standards, defendant cannot be allowed to try to prove by affidavit that
plea agreement is other than it appears, unambiguously), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1314 (1993); U.S.
v. Savage, 978 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992) (because court had not yet approved of plea
agreement, neither government nor defendant bound by terms; there may be an exception where
defendant relies to his detriment on unapproved plea deal), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1613 (1993);
U.S. v. Gamble, 917 F.2d 1280, 1282 (10th Cir. 1990) (clear and unambiguous plea agreement
leaving sentencing to judge's discretion under Sentencing Guidelines negated defendant's unsup-
ported claim of prosecutor's promise of no more than four-year sentence). But see U.S. v.
Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 1992) (although plea agreements are contractual in nature,
defendant's underlying right to contract is constitutional and therefore implicates concerns
additional to those raised by commercial contracts between private parties (citing U.S. v. Harvey,
791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986))); U.S. v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 1990) (although
plea agreements are like contracts, court was not allowed to 6'revisit" original plea agreement
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breached.'"~ If the defendant breaches a plea agreement, the government is
because of a mutual mistake); U.S. v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (although
plea agreement treated as contract, agreement/contract analogy does not extend so far as to
allow district court to revisit accepted plea to reconsider whether "contract" formed; court not
empowered to consider contract defense other than breach); U.S. v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520,
1523-24 (11th Cir. 1990) (although plea agreement written, should not be read to contradict
parties' oral understanding).
The Eleventh Circuit has indicated that the government is not bound by an agreement between
a defendant and a federal agent if the agent lacks authority to bind the government. U.S. v.
Kettering, 861 F.2d 675, 679-80 (11th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, the defendant may attempt to
enforce such agreement if she can demonstrate detrimental reliance on promises in that agree-
ment. Id. (no detrimental reliance when defendant fully aware at time of entering plea that
government refused to enforce proposal and when prosecution could not, and did not, pse
information obtained from defendant). However, a defendant can only attempt to enforce
something that is part of the actual plea agreement. See U.S. v. Romero, 967 F.2d 63, 67-68 (2d
Cir. 1992) (plea agreement did not prevent government from indicting defendant for other
preplea activities not covered by agreement).
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that the government is not bound by an agreement between
a defendant and an FBI agent when the defendant did not rely on the agreement to his
detriment. U.S. v. Streebing, 987 F.2d 368, 372-73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2933 (1993).
1323. The specific facts of each case determine what constitutes a breach. Compare U.S. v.
Mercedes-Amparo, 980 F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1992) (government breached plea agreement
obligation to recommend sentence within sentencing guidelines range by failing to recommend a
sentence); U.S. v. Badaracco. 954 F.2d 928, 940 (3d Cir. 1992) (government breached agreement
when parties stipulated that crime involved minimal planning and prosecutor later argued that
defendant took "affirmative step indicating that he was concealing something"); U.S. v. West, 2
F.3d 66, 69-70 (4th Cir. 1993) (defendant breached plea agreement by unjustifiably failing to
respond to government's repeated requests for his plea; the breach relieved the government of its
obligations under the agreement, even though defendant relied on agreement to his substantial
detriment); U.S. v. Valencia, 985 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1993) (government breached agreement
stating that U.S. stipulated that defendant had accepted responsibility when prosecutor com-
mented at resentencing that defendant should not be entitled to credit for accepting responsibil-
ity); U.S. v. Mandell, 905 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1990) (government breached agreement that
defendant would be sentenced at offense level of 20 kilograms of marijuana when court imposed
sentence based on offense level of 27, although sentence imposed within range appropriate for
offense level of 20); U.S. v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1335 (7th Cir. 1988) (defendant breached
unambiguous agreement to cooperate with government by not testifying at codefendant's retrial);
U.S. v. Van Horn, 976 F.2d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1992) (government breached plea agreement
stipulating that it would not seek upward departure from offense level calculated by U.S.
Probation Office when it recommended an upward departure after the district court rejected the
offense level recommendations in the presentence report); U.S. v. Fagan, 996 F.2d 1009, 1013
(9th Cir. 1993) (government breached plea agreement by failing to offer agreement to judge in
second case when agreement stipulated defendant would plead guilty in two cases) and U.S. v.
Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575, 1578-79 (lth Cir. 1992) (government breached plea agreement to
stipulate that offense involved two ounces of cocaine when prosecutor referred to three kilograms
of cocaine at sentencing) with U.S. v. Oyegbola, 961 F.2d 11, 14-15 (1st Cir.) (no breach of
government's agreement to recommend sentence at lowest range of applicable sentencing guide-
lines when prosecutor miscalculated estimate of appropriate sentencing range), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. June 25, 1992) (No. 92-5047); U.S. v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 817-18 (2d Cir. 1992) (no
breach of government's agreement to provide court only with certain information about defendant's
crime when government presented court with memo detailing overt acts other than those
admitted by defendant); U.S. v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1076-77 (4th Cir.) (no breach of
government's agreement to move for special assistance when defendant failed to provide requi-
site level of assistance), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 420 (1991); U.S. v. Hoster, 988 F.2d 1374, 1378
(5th Cir. 1993) (no breach of governments agreement not to prosecute for additional offenses
when district court included chemical used in drug transaction as relevant conduct for purposes
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free to reprosecute the defendant," 24 and may bring more serious charges., 31
of sentencing defendant for possession of amphetamine); U.S. v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir.
1993) (no breach of government's agreement not to prosecute defendant in certain jurisdictions
when it prosecuted.him in a jurisdiction not mentioned as one in which it would not prosecute
him), cert. denied sub. nom., Murr v. U.S., 1994 U.S. Lexis 1540 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1994); U.S. V.
Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir.) (no breach of government's agreement for leniency when
defendant sentenced to 50 years because maximum sentence life without parole), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 981 (1990); White v. U.S., 998 F.2d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 1993) (no breach of government's
agreement when government characterized defendant's assistance as limited and less valuable
than expected when agreement gave government sole discretion to determine whether defendant
had provided substantial assistance); U.S. v. Gerace, 997 F.2d 1293, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1993) (no
breach of government's agreement when it promised to "stand silent at sentencing" but later
argued against leniency at subsequent probation revocation hearing); U.S. v. Walling, 982 F.2d
447, 449 (10th Cir. 1992) (no breach of government's agreement not to request upward departure
from sentencing guideline range when it presented evidence in support of probation officer's
recommended upward adjustment because departures differ from adjustments) and Shades Ridge
Holding Co. v. U.S., 888 F.2d 725, 730 (11th Cir. 1989) (no breach of government's agreement to
absolve holding company from liability for tax evasion when government instituted action to
collect taxes owed by defendant from assets of holding company because agreement pertained
only to defendant's criminal liability), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
In assessing an alleged breach, the court must first determine the parties' reasonable understand-
ing of the terms of the plea agreement. U.S. v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1181 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990). See Marx v. U.S., 930 F.2d 1246, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1991)
(government did not breach promise to deliver cattle to defendant's family as part of plea
agreement by failing to satisfy encumbrances on cattle because defendant's expectations objec-
tively unreasonable), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1480 (1992). In addition, contract principles require
that the party claiming breach must prove the breach by a preponderance of the evidence. See
U.S. v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890-91 (7th Cir. 1986) (due process does not require proof of
breach of plea agreement beyond a reasonable doubt; preponderance of the evidence sufficient).
Due process requires that any ambiguity be construed against the government and in accor-
dance with the defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement. U.S. v. Coleman, 895
F.2d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 1990) (in determining government's breach, court looks at provisions and
construes ambiguous terms against government); U.S. v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir.
1990) (same). Compare Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1988) (when plea
agreement or court did not clearly inform defendant that breach could result in inability to
withdraw plea and imposition of more severe sentence without trial, denial of motion to withdraw
plea denied due process), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989); U.S. v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th
Cir. 1986) (when agreement barring further prosecution did not specify that promise limited to
specific district and government could show no extrinsic evidence supporting contrary view,
prosecution barred in all districts); U.S. v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1991) (when
plea agreement did not discuss downward departure, request for downward departure required
when prosecutor's transmittal letter indicated that departure would be sought) and U.S. v.
Greenwood, 812 F.2d 632, 635-36 (10th Cir. 1987) (when defendant reasonably understood
prosecutor's promise not to suggest incarceration to mean prosecution would not disparage
defendant at hearing, government breached by suggesting example be made of defendant) with
U.S. v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (1st Cir. 1988) (agreement not to prosecute crimes
"related to" theft of vans did not bar prosecution on charges of insurance fraud and arson
involving goods taken from stolen vans because no party could reasonably understand agreement
to extend to those charges) and U.S. v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir.) (agreement allowing
prosecutor to seek downward departure based on defendant's assistance did not require depar-
ture because agreement left decision solely within discretion of government), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 357 (1992).
1324. See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1987) (agreement void and government
allowed to reinstate original charges when defendant fulfilled promise to testify at trial of
codefendants but refused to testify at retrial, even though defendant later volunteered to testify
after losing appeal), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992); U.S. v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1338 (7th
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In Ricketts v. Adamson,"326 the Supreme Court held that the government may
revoke a plea agreement 327 for a defendant's breach even after the defendant
was sentenced and began serving the sentence.112 The Court reasoned that
double jeopardy did not bar prosecution on the original charges because the
agreement provided that it would be rendered void upon defendant's breach.13 29
A defendant Who alleges that the government breached a plea agreement is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing or, in the court's discretion, discovery or
expansion of the record. 330 If a breach by the government is demonstrated,
the court has discretion to cure it by allowing withdrawal of the plea, altering
the sentence, or ordering specific performance of the agreement.' 331 Specific
Cir. 1988) (agreement void and government free to reindict on same charge when defendant
refused to testify at codefendant's retrial). Cf. U.S. v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir.
1989) (like defendant, government entitled either to withdrawal or specific performance if
determined appropriate; however, government waived right to rescind agreement and only
specific performance remained when government proceeded with sentencing). But cf. U.S. v.
Vogt, 901 F.2d 100, 102 (8th Cir. 1990) (government waived right to complain of defendant's
breach when delayed 10 weeks before acting on breach and continued to accept benefits of
agreement).
1325. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. In Bordenkircher, the Supreme Court held that the
prosecutor did not violate the defendant's right to due process when he carried out a threat made
during plea negotiations to reindict the accused on more serious charges if the defendant did not
plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged. Id. at 365.
1326. 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
1327. See U.S. v. Savage, 978 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1992) (government allowed to
withdraw plea agreement prior to court acceptance when defendant assaulted deputy U.S.
marshal and attempted to escape from courtroom and when defendant did not detrimentally rely
oh the agreement), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1613 (1993).
1328. Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 9-12. The agreement in Ricketts called for the defendant to testify at
the trial of his codefendants, which he did. Id. at 4. When the codefendants' convictions were
later vacated, however, the defendant refused to testify at their retrial. Id. The prosecution
considered the defendant's assertion that his obligation had ended when he was sentenced a
breach and reinstated charges against the defendant. Id.
1329. Id. at 12.
1330. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75-76, 80-82 (1977). A court may dispense with a
hearing if the defendant's allegations are "palpably incredible" or "patently frivolous or false."
Id. at 76. Compare McKenzie v. Wainwright, 632 F.2d 649, 651-52 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendant not
entitled to hearing when failed to corroborate allegations, did not allege breach for three years,
and small difference between actual sentence and sentence allegedly promised); U.S. v. Osborne,
931 F.2d 1139, 1168 (7th Cir. 1991) (defendant not entitled to evidentiary hearing following
unsupported allegation that agreement had been breached); Watts v. U.S., 841 F.2d 275, 277-78
(9th Cir. 1988) (defendant not entitled to evidentiary hearing on alleged government breach of
secret agreement when defendant never mentioned agreement after sentencing at rule 35 hearing
or in postsentence letter to judge) and U.S. v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam) (defendant not entitled to hearing based on allegation that government misrepresented
defendant's level of cooperation when defendant failed to present facts which, if proven, would
establish illegality of sentence or gross abuse of discretion) with U.S. v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527,
1532-33 (11th Cir. 1992) (defendant entitled to evidentiary hearing when plea agreement obli-
gated prosecutors to inform trial court of the nature and extent of defendants' assistance).
1331. See U.S. v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $228,536, 895 F.2d 908, 914 (2d Cir.)
(defendant not entitled to specific performance of agreement that defendant would not have to
pay forfeiture when bargain did not contain term that government not seek forfeiture and
defendant told court no other promises made), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 958 (1990); U.S. v. Hayes,
946 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 1991) (defendant entitled to remand for court to determine remedy
when government breached agreement not to make sentencing recommendation); U.S. v. Ring-
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performance is generally ordered only if the defendant can show prejudice
from the breach. 1332 If a federal court finds that state prosecutors have
breached a plea agreement, it should remand the case so that a state court can
devise the proper remedy.
1333
To foster open discussions during plea negotiations, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that evidence of
withdrawn guilty pleas, statements made in the course of proceedings under
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, and statements made in the course of plea negotiations
that do not result in a guilty plea or that result in a guilty plea that is later
withdrawn, are inadmissible at trial against the defendant who made the plea
or participated in the plea discussions.1 334 Statements made to government
agents who are not attorneys are not subject to this evidentiary bar and may be
ling, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993) (defendant entitled to withdraw plea when government's
failure to question defendant prior to sentencing, and its resultant inability to comment as to the
value of defendant's cooperation, breached plea agreement upon which defendant relied in which
government agreed to make nature and extent of defendant's cooperation known); U.S. v.
Mandell, 905 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1990) (defendant entitled to withdraw plea because
agreement specified withdrawal as remedy after breach, making withdrawal and specific perfor-
mance equivalent, when judge sentenced at offense level greater than that specified in agree-
ment); U.S. v. Norgaard, 959 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1992) (defendant entitled to remand for
sentencing when government breached plea agreement by attempting to impose previously
suspended sentence despite agreement that any sentence must run concurrently with separate
drug conviction where drug sentence fully served).
1332. Compare U.S. v. Watson, 988 F.2d 544, 552 (5th Cir. 1993) (defendant obtained specific
performance of plea agreement conditioned on his substantial assistance when government
bargained away its discretion not to submit a § 5K1.1 motion), celt. denied, 114 S. Ct. 698 (1994)
and U.S. v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1523, 1525 (11th Cir.) (defendant granted specific perfor-
mance when prejudiced by allegations in presentence report beyond those facts stipulated to in
agreement), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988) with U.S. v. Holman, 728 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir.)
(defendant not entitled to specific performance even when prejudice found because defendant
accepted new plea bargain after breach), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984); U.S. v. Benson, 836
F.2d 1133, 1136 (8th Cir. 1988) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of agreement to
have FBI agents testify to defendant's cooperation when prejudice to defendant cured by letter
from Assistant U.S. Attorney to judge regarding defendant's cooperation with FBI agent) and
U.S. v. Kettering, 861 F.2d 675, 680 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant not entitled to specific perfor-
mance of nonbinding plea agreement when failed to demonstrate detrimental reliance on
agreement).
1333. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63. Although the federal court may not decide on an initial
remedy, it may enforce constitutional guarantees. See Hayes v. Maggio, 699 F.2d 198, 204 (5th
Cir. 1983) (writ of habeas corpus to be issued in 90 days, unless state either assures eligibility for
parole in compliance with plea agreement or vacates plea and initiates trial procedures when
state breached agreement that defendant receive sentence with parole eligibility in 10 years).
1334. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) & advisory committee's note (1980); FED. R. EVID. 410. Cf.
U.S. v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1465-66 (11th Cir. 1987) (no error to admit codefendants' plea
agreements when redacted versions of such agreements added nothing to evidence already
admitted). But cf. U.S. v. Escamilla, 975 F.2d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1992) (confession obtained in
plea agreement which government subsequently revoked could not be admitted for use against
defendant); U.S. v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993) (not harmless error to
introduce contradictory impeachment evidence in violation of 11(e)(6)).
In addition, a statement covered by rule 11(e)(6) may be admissible if another statement, made
in the course of the same plea or plea discussions, is introduced into evidence and fairness
requires contemporaneous consideration. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6)(D); FED. R. EvID. 410. Such
statements are also admissible in criminal proceedings for perjury or false statements if the
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admissible. 1335 Evidence of a witness's prior plea agreement is admissible
when introduced to demonstrate or attack her credibility. 336
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea. A defendant is permitted to enter a
plea of guilty.1337 A defendant admits all of the elements of the charged crime
statements are made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6)(D)(ii); FED. R. EvID. 410.
The protection of rule 11(e)(6) cannot be waived because it is a guaranty of fair procedure.
Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1452, 1454.
1335. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) advisory committee's note; FED. R. EVID. 410. The advisory
committee stressed, however, that statements made to nonattorney government agents, "espe-
cially when the agents purport to have authority to bargain," are not inevitably admissible. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) advisory committee's note. The admissibility of such statements should be
governed by the ordinary rules of evidence, in particular "that body of law dealing with police
interrogations." Id; see Rachlin v. U.S., 723 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1983) (rule 11(e)(6)(D)
inapplicable to statements defendant made to Secret Service agents with no authority to bargain
when defendant initiated conversation and defendant not in custody at time of confession).
In U.S. v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), the Fifth Circuit articulated a
two-part test to govern the admissibility of a defendant's statements to nonattorney government
agents. First, the court must determine whether the defendant exhibited an actual subjective
expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and second, whether the expectation
was reasonable. Id. at 1366; see also U.S. v. Brooks, 670 F.2d 625, 627-28 (5th Cir. 1982)
(defendant's statements to agents admissible because not part of plea negotiations; defendant
could not have reasonably believed agent had negotiating authority); U.S. v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d
1234, 1240-41 (7th Cir.) (recorded conversation between defendant and FBI informant about
possibility of plea bargain admissible because defendant had no subjective expectation of negotiat-
ing plea), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1980); U.S. v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1367-68 (9th Cir.
1988) (defendant's statements to FBI agents admissible when defendant did not claim he
subjectively believed he was engaged in plea discussions when he made the incriminating
statements). But see U.S. v. Fant, 974 F.2d 559, 564 (4th Cir. 1992) (when plea agreement
contained immunity provisions which prohibited government from using any information pro-
vided by defendant for sentencing purposes, court erred in allowing use in presentencing report
of postplea incriminating statements made to probation officer).
1336. See U.S. v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029, 1047 (11th Cir. 1986) (admission of related plea
agreement and accurate comment thereon not reversible error when used to bolster witness's
credibility), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1037 (1987).
1337. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a). The court must enter a plea of not guilty if a defendant refuses
to plead. Id.
Rule 11 also permits a defendant to plead not guilty or nolo contendere. Id. By pleading nolo
contendere, a defendant does not admit her guilt to the charged offense, but the plea has the same
effect at sentencing as a guilty plea. Hudson v. U.S., 272 U.S. 451, 457 (1926) (nolo contendere
plea authorizes court to sentence defendant as if guilty). Like a guilty plea, a nolo contendere plea
waives several constitutional rights and, therefore, must be made knowingly and voluntarily.
Manley v. U.S., 588 F.2d 79, 81 n.3 (4th Cir. 1978). A plea of nolo contendere may be entered only
with the consent of the court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). In consenting, the court must consider the
views of the parties and the interests of the public in the administration of criminal justice. Id.
A stipulation of facts may serve as the functional equivalent of a guilty plea; thus, courts must
insure that agreements to such stipulations are made knowingly and voluntarily. See U.S. v.
Stalder, 696 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1982) (stipulation made knowingly when district judge specifi-
cally asked defendant if he understood right to jury trial waived). But cf. U.S. v. Lawson, 682 F.2d
1012, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (no need to determine whether plea knowing and voluntary when
defendant stipulated only to what witnesses would have said, not to their veracity). The court,
however, need not conduct an on-the-record inquiry to determine whether the stipulation is
voluntary. See Stamps v. Rees, 834 F.2d 1269, 1275-76 (6th Cir. 1987) (when defense counsel in
habitual offender proceeding stipulated only to previously proven convictions, stipulation not de
facto guilty plea and court not required to hold on-record voluntariness inquiry), cert. denied, 485
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when she enters a guilty plea. 338 Because a defendant waives many constitu-
tional rights by pleading guilty, the plea must be entered into knowingly and
voluntarily 3 3 19 with the advice of competent counsel.1
340
U.S. 980 (1988). Stipulations to incriminating facts differ from guilty and nolo contendere pleas
because a defendant who enters a stipulatioli retains the right to confront witnesses, challenge
nonjurisdictional matters on appeal, and present defenses. See U.S. v. Robertson, 698 F.2d 703,
710 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant's plea of not guilty coupled with inculpatory stipulation was
equivalent to plea of not guilty; without evidence of prosecutorial overreaching, defendant not
entitled to rule 11 safeguards, but still entitled to confront witnesses and to challenge nonjurisdic-
tional defects).
1338. U.S. v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989); McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). See
U.S. v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1989) (entry of guilty plea constituted admission to
stealing insured parcels and established number and value of parcels taken for sentencing
purposes); U.S. v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir.) (entry of guilty plea foreclosed defendant
from contesting adequacy of merits), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 167 (1993); Mack v. U.S., 853 F.2d
585, 586 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (entry of guilty plea established all elements for commission
of bank robbery); U.S. v. Kidder, 869 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1989) (entry of guilty plea to
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute constituted admission of each element of crime
and precluded defendant from claiming actions involuntary); Blohm v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir. 1993) (entry of guilty plea to tax evasion collaterally
estopped defendant from denying fraud in subsequent civil proceeding); cf. Gray v. Commis-
sioner, 708 F.2d 243, 246 (6th Cir. 1983) (guilty plea to tax evasion collaterally estopped
defendant from litigating fraud element of civil tax fraud charge), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927
(1984). But cf. Thompson v. Blackburn, 776 F.2d 118, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1985) (although defendant
pleaded guilty to charge that crime committed at some time during three-year period specified in
charges, defendant not precluded in habeas corpus proceeding from challenging state's new
stricter sentencing law as ex post facto by alleging crime not committed after enactment of new
law).
1339. Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523 (1992) (a guilty plea must be both knowing and
voluntary). Compare Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969) (guilty plea unconstitutional
because no record of whether plea made knowingly and voluntarily); McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467
(guilty plea invalid under rule 11 because defendant not addressed individually by judge to
determine voluntariness); Valencia v. U.S., 923 F.2d 917, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1991) (guilty plea
invalid because not knowing and voluntary when defendant who possessed minimal formal
education and little familiarity with American legal system not adequately informed on essential
elements of charge) and U.S. v. Cortez, 973 F.2d 764, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1992) (guilty plea
involuntary when defendant under mistaken belief, fostered by misrepresentations of defense
counsel, court, and government, that plea would not hinder ability to assert selective prosecution
motion on appeal and in actuality plea waived right to assert such motion on appeal) with
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970) (guilty plea not unknowing merely because
attorney erroneously concluded that confessions admissible); Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 749-50
(1970) (guilty plea not involuntary merely because failure to plead guilty would entail risk of
death sentence); U.S. v. Zorrilla, 982 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1992) (guilty plea not involuntary when
district court judge gave thorough explanation of charges, asked defendant several questions to
ensure he understood charges and maximum possible sentence which could be imposed), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1665 (1993); U.S. v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 8 (4th Cir. 1988) (guilty plea not
involuntary or violation of due process when counsel failed to mention deportation conse-
quences); Spinelli v. Collins, 992 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1993) (guilty plea not involuntary when
defendant's mistaken belief as to parole eligibility was not based on any promises made by
defense attorney, prosecutor or court); Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1993)
(guilty plea not involuntary even though defendant only spoke Spanish when petitioner had
experienced Spanish-speaking attorney and court provided interpreter); U.S. v. Ataya, 864 F.2d
1324, 1332 (7th Cir. 1988) (guilty plea not involuntary when defendant had aid of effective
counsel, squarely questioned by court if understood and accepted terms, and stated under oath
that bound by agreement); U.S. v. Dalman, 994 F.2d 537, 539 (8th Cir. 1993) (guilty plea not
involuntary when no showing that medications affected defendant at time of plea hearing so as to
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The court must also ensure that the defendant is competent to enter a guilty
plea. 1341 The Supreme Court held, in Godinez v. Moran, 1342 that the standard
of competency for pleading guilty or waving the right to counsel is the same as
the competency standard for standing trial. 1343 In making this determination, a
court must consider: (1) whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding;"
and (2) "whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him."13
make him incapable of knowingly and intelligently entering his guilty plea) and Osborn v.
Shillinger, 997 F.2d 1324, 1328 (10th Cir. 1993) (guilty plea not involuntary when made only to
avoid death penalty even if possibility that death penalty unconstitutional).
Parental consent is not required for a minor to plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily. Ford v.
Lockhart, 904 F.2d 458, 463 (8th Cir. 1990).
When the government and a group of defendants have entered into an all-or-nothing plea
agreement under which each of the defendants must plead guilty in order for any of them to get
the benefits of the deal, the court must make a more careful determination of whether there were
pressures among codefendants which might render pleas involuntary. U.S. v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657,
660 (9th Cir. 1993).
1340. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 263 (1973) (citing Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 758
(1970)). But cf. U.S. v. Pregler, 925 F.2d 268, 269 (8th Cir. 1991) (defendant's lack of counsel
when entering plea agreement not grounds for setting aside knowing and voluntary plea of guilty
because agreement alone has no constitutional significance until embodied in guilty plea before
court); Risher v. U.S., 992 F.2d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 1993) (failure of counsel to warn defendant
before he entered his guilty plea that there was risk he would be sentenced as career offender fell
below required level of professional competence); Wilson v. U.S., 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir.
1992) (per curiam) (defendant's guilty plea waived ineffective assistance of counsel claims
concerning preplea issues).
. 1341. In order to be competent to plead guilty, a defendant must necessarily be competent to
stand trial. Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). For further discussion of this issue,
see COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL in this Part.
1342. 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
1343. Id., at 2685-86.
1344. Id; see Hernandez-Hernandez v. U.S., 904 F.2d 758, 760-61 (1st Cir. 1990) (defendant
competent to enter guilty plea and no "reasonable cause" to hold sua sponte hearing on
competency when defendant gave coherent answers during plea hearing, despite evidence of
defendant's drug use and psychiatric treatment); Chichakly v. U.S., 926 F.2d 624, 631-33 (7th Cir.
1991) (defendant competent to enter guilty plea when trial court questioned defendant about
habits of taking medications and observed competency at time of plea, despite defendant's
ingestion of prescription medications); Treadwell v. Lockhart, 948 F.2d 453, 454 (8th Cir. 1991)
(defendant competent and not entitled to competency hearing prior to entering guilty plea when
psychiatrist sympathetic to defendant could find no mental abnormalities); U.S. v. Lewis, 991
F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir.) (defendant competent when did not bring evidence of diminished mexntal
capacity to the attention of the judges, and did not suggest that his behavior was irrational), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 216 (1993). But cf. U.S. v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d 588, 596 (1st Cir. 1991)
(court's guilty plea colloquy insufficient to insure defendant's competency when defendapt
acknowledged use of three prescription drugs within 24 hours of plea hearing).
The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that trial courts should exercise greater care in
determining competency to plead guilty than in determining competency to stand trial because a
guilty plea actively waives several constitutional rights. See Matusiak v. Kelly, 786 F.2d 536,
542-43 (2d Cir.) (higher standard of competency required for valid guilty plea than for compe-
tency to stand trial; series of coltradictory statements to court, views of two of three experts, and
history of institutionalization indicated defendant not competent to plead guilty), cert. dismissed,
479 U.S. 805 (1986); Chavez v. U.S., 656 F.2d 512, 519 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant competent
to stand trial but not necessarily competent to plead guilty; evidence including outburst in open
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A guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional constitutional rights13 41 such as the
right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege
against self-incrimination.13 46 A guilty plea may also waive claims of illegal
search and seizure, 1347 coerced confession,13 8 improper grand jury selec-
tion, 1 349 denial of a speedy trial, 3"0 as well as the entrapment defense 135 1 and
court, psychiatric findings, and history of mental illness raised doubt of sufficient competence to
plead guilty).
1345. Tolett, 411 U.S. at 267 ("When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open
court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the
entry of the guilty plea."); see U.S. v. Easton, 937 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1991) (guilty plea waived
right to challenge validity of unsigned indictment because rule requiring signature nonjurisdic-
tional), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 906 (1992); U.S. v. Seybold, 979 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1992) (a
knowingly and voluntarily entered guilty plea waives jurisdictional challenges to the constitution-
ality of the conviction), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2980 (1993).
1346. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243; McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. See Smith v. U.S., 876 F.2d 655, 657
(8th Cir.) (per curiam) (guilty plea waived privilege against self-incrimination challenge when
plea voluntary), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989); U.S. v. Hickok, 907 F.2d 983, 985-86 (10th Cir.
1990) (guilty plea waived right to jury trial).
If state law permits a defendant who pleads guilty to appeal issues after the plea has been
entered, a federal court may review those claims on habeas corpus review. Lefkowitz v. Newsome,
420 U.S. 283, 292-93 (1975); see also Gibson v. Klevenhagen, 777 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (5th Cir.
1985) (speedy trial claim not forfeited by guilty plea because Texas law permitted defendant to
plead guilty without forfeiting right to judicial review of constitutional claims raised by written
motion at trial).
1347. See Gioiosa v. U.S., 684 F.2d 176, 180 (Ist Cir. 1982) (defendant precluded from
challenging on appeal evidence obtained from illegal search and seizure unless plea coerced or
rendered involuntary because of fact that evidence illegally seized); U.S. v. Arango, 966 F.2d 64,
66 (2d Cir. 1992) (defendant precluded from challenging legality of search and seizure after
guilty plea); U.S. v. Smallwood, 920 F.2d 1231, 1240 (5th Cir.) (defendant precluded from
challenging on appeal that evidence considered in sentencing illegally seized when motion to
suppress denied prior to entrance of guilty plea), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2870 (1991); Smith v.
U.S., 876 F.2d 655, 657 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (defendant precluded from challenging legality of
search and seizure when guilty plea voluntary), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989).
1348. McMann, 397 U.S. at 768-69, 771; see also U.S. v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 442 (Ist Cir.
1989) (guilty plea waived right to challenge voluntariness of confession); U.S. v. Huff, 873 F.2d
709, 712 (3d Cir. 1989) (guilty plea waived right to challenge voluntariness of oral and written
inculpatory statements made prior to entry of plea); Rogers v. Maggio, 714 F.2d 35, 38 (5th Cir.
1983) (guilty plea waived right to appeal denial of challenge to voluntariness of confession). But
cf Key v. U.S., 806 F.2d 133, 136-37 (7th Cir. 1986) (guilty plea will not forever bind defendant to
responses to court's questions on entry of guilty plea if defendant presents new specific allega-
tions as to voluntariness in collateral proceedings).
1349. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266-67 (guilty plea foreclosed inquiry into claim of discrimination
in grand jury selection).
1350. See Acha v. U.S., 910 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (right to challenge
violation of Speedy Trial Act nonjurisdictional and waived by guilty plea); Lebowitz v. U.S., 877
F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); U.S. v. Gines, 964 F.2d 972, 977 (10th Cir. 1992) (same), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1023 (1993); Tiemens v. U.S., 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11th Cir.) (per curiam)
(constitutional right to speedy trial nonjurisdictional and waived by guilty plea), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 837 (1984).
1351. See U.S. v. Riles, 928 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1991) (defendant who knowingly and
voluntarily pleaded guilty could not argue entrapment at sentencing because defendant admitted
predisposition to commit offense by pleading guilty).
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other prosecutorial defects." 52 A guilty plea does not foreclose a subsequent
claim by the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because such issues are not
"necessarily" determined in a criminal proceeding. 313
A guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional challenges to conviction1314 such
as failure of the indictment to charge an offense,""55 lack of subject matter
1352. See Valencia v. U.S., 923 F.2d 917, 920-21 (1st Cir. 1991) (guilty plea waived challenge to
factual or legal foundations of indictment); Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1986)
(guilty plea waived claim that indictment not served on defendant in accordance with state law);
U.S. v. Scherl, 923 F.2d 64, 66 (7th Cir.) (guilty plea waived challenge to "multiplicitous"
indictment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2272 (1991); U.S. v. Fletcher, 731 F.2d 581, 582 (8th Cir.) (per
curiam) (guilty plea waived challenge to errors in prosecution's revocation of plea agreement),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984).
A guilty plea may also waive claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness. See U.S. v. Taylor, 814 F:2d
172, 174 (5th Cir.) (guilty plea waived claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness through alleged
breach of pretrial agreement), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 865 (1987); U.S. v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549,
552-53 (9th Cir. 1989) (guilty plea waived claim that "outrageous government conduct" violated
due process even though record at time judge accepted plea contained allegations of unconstitu-
tional behavior, but establishing truth of allegations required further proceedings). But cf.
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-31 (1974) (defendant allowed to appeal felony conviction
based on guilty plea when prosecutor obtained felony indictment in apparent retaliation for
defendant's appeal of prior misdemeanor conviction); Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011,
1019-20 (9th Cir. 1988) (presumption of vindictiveness raised when prosecutor sought death
penalty after guilty plea; defendant entitled to evidentiary hearing on matter when state did not
rebut presumption), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990).
Finally, a valid guilty plea may waive a number of statutory claims. See Acevedo-Ramos v. U.S.,
961 F.2d 305, 308-09 (1st .Cir.) (guilty plea waived right to challenge based on statute of
limitations), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 299 (1992); Baxter v. U.S., 966 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1992)
(per curiam) (guilty plea waived right to assert violations of Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Act).
1353. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 316-17 (1983). Section 1983 claims are discussed in
PROCEDURAL MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT UNDER 42 u.s.c. § 1983 in Part VI.
1354. In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam), the Supreme Court noted that
because a guilty plea is an admission of the facts alleged, it removes the issue of factual guilt from
the case and "simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent
with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if
factual guilt is validly established." Id. at 62-63 n.2. Jurisdictional issues, therefore, are rights
which are justified as protecting something other than the truthseeking process. See id. at 62-63
(guilty plea cannot waive double jeopardy claim because government may not prosecute defen-
dant regardless of factual guilt); U.S. v. Harper, 901 F.2d 471, 472-73 (5th Cir. 1990) (guilty plea
does not bar habeas corpus petition on indictment because plea does not waive jurisdictional
defects); U.S. v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (lth Cir. 1990) (guilty plea does not bar
challenge that state may not prosecute for offense and its lesser included offense and therefore
plea did not waive double jeopardy rights).
1355. Compare U.S. v. Morales-Rosales, 838 F.2d 1359, 1361-62 (5th Cir. 1988) (guilty plea no
bar to claim that information failed to allege willful transport of illegal alien, essential element of
offense involving violation of immigration laws) and U.S. v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th
Cir. 1979) (guilty plea no bar to claim that indictment failed on its face to charge offense of
falsifying documents), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980) with U.S. v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247,
1251-52 (5th Cir.) (although guilty plea no bar to challenging indictment, indictment not so
defective as to warrant vacatur because language "knowingly transport" and statutory citation in
indictment set forth necessary elements of crime of transporting undocumented alien), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989) and O'Leary v. U.S., 856 F.2d 1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
(guilty plea bar to challenging sufficiency of indictment which clearly specified that "using mail to
deposit corporate funds into subsidiary account was necessary part of defendant's scheme").
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jurisdiction,13 56 or the claim that the sentencing judge lacked impartiality.13 57
In some circumstances, a guilty plea does not waive the right to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute defining the charged offense. 1358
Entry of a guilty plea does not normally foreclose a double jeopardy chal-
lenge; 1359 however, the Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea does waive a
double jeopardy challenge to the crimes admitted in the plea agreement.' 360
In federal court, with the approval of the court 3 6' and the consent of the
government, 362 a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving
in writing the right to appeal specified pretrial motions.' 363 A defendant who
1356. Hayle v. U.S., 815 F.2d 879, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1987) (to sustain challenge to court's
jurisdiction, defendant who pleaded guilty must show that indictment contained charges to which
he pleaded that are not federal offenses). Cf. Mack v. U.S., 853 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (defendant's challenge to jurisdiction denied because indictment charged all requisite
parts of federal offense and plea admitted those factual allegations); U.S. v. Mathews, 833 F.2d
161, 164 (9th Cir. 1987) (defendant's challenge to jurisdiction denied because guilty plea
admitted factual allegations in indictment that formed predicate for federal jurisdiction).
1357. See U.S. v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1989) (defendant, by pleading guilty,
did not waive challenge of judge's actual bias); U.S. v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (10th Cir.)
(defendant, by pleading guilty, did not waive right to appeal trial court's denial of recusal motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) when judge had been U.S. Attorney at time defendant prosecuted on
other charges), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988).
1358. See U.S. v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (guilty plea no
bar to challenging constitutionality of statute forbidding possession of marijuana), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 918 (1979); U.S. v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 & n.1 (9th Cir.) (guilty plea no bar to
challenging constitutionality of statute prohibiting assault of non-Indian within Indian reserva-
tion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979). Cf U.S. v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1989) (guilty
plea no bar to challenging constitutionality of Sentencing Reform Act). The defendant may not
challenge the statute, however, if the facts admitted by the guilty plea render the statute's alleged
unconstitutionality moot as to the defendant. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (guilty plea waived
defendant's right to challenge constitutionality of federal kidnapping statute with potential death
penalty); Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980) (guilty plea waived defendant's
right to challenge statute's allegedly unconstitutional presumption of intent when defendant
admitted intent in guilty plea and state never utilized presumption), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085
(1981); U.S. v. Burke, 694 F.2d 632, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1982) (guilty plea waived defendant's right
to challenge statute prohibiting commodity transactions because plea established all elements of
crime).
1359. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2; see U.S. v. Baugh, 787 F.2d 1131, 1132 (7th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (guilty plea did not waive claim that information or indictment alleging seven counts of
receiving firearms, on its face, violated double jeopardy); U.S. v. Blocker, 802 F.2d 1102, 1103-04
(9th Cir. 1986) (guilty plea did not waive claim that punishment imposed under two separate
statutes violated double jeopardy when prosecution arose from single act of defendant).
1360. Broce, 488 U.S. at 571-73 (defendant waived double jeopardy challenge by admitting to
two distinct crimes of conspiracy in guilty plea). See also, DOUBLE JEOPARDY in this Part.
1361. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); see U.S. v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 288 (4th Cir. 1991) (court
not required to accept conditional plea and not required to give effect to unaccepted sentencing
proposal); U.S. v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1527-28 (10th Cir.) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to
admit conditional plea because trial court has absolute discretion), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 856
(1990). In U.S. v. Henriquez, 731 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit stated that courts
should exercise caution in accepting conditional guilty pleas because such pleas undercut the
finality of judgments and create unnecessary appellate litigation. Id. at 133 n.1.
1362. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
1363. Id; cf. U.S. v. Simmons, 763 F.2d 529, 533 (2d Cir. 1985) (claim of prosecutorial
misconduct waived when not reserved in conditional guilty plea); U.S. v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058,
1063-65 (5th Cir.) (claim of entrapment and governmental overreaching waived when not re-
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prevails on appeal of those specified motions is allowed to withdraw the
conditional plea. 13
64
Requirements for Entering the Plea. Rule 11 requires the disclosure of the
terms of a plea bargain in open court when the agreement is reached or, upon
a showing of good cause, in camera at the time the plea is offered. 365 If the
agreement calls for the prosecutor to move for dismissal of other charges or to
agree that a specific sentence is appropriate, the court may accept or reject the
agreement at its discretion, 1366 or defer decision until it has considered the
presentence report. 1367 If the court rejects an agreement,1 368 it must advise the
served in conditional guilty plea), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985); U.S. v. Echegoyen, 799 F,2d
1271, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1986) (claim of illegal search of residence waived when not reserved in
writing in conditional guilty plea, even if record showed understanding between defense and
prosecution that issues preserved).At least one circuit has held that it is not necessary to inform the defendant about the
conditional plea alternative. U.S. v. Daniel, 866 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1989) (failure of trial
court to inform defendant of conditional plea possibility not error because rule allowing court
and government to approve conditional plea does not entitle defendant to enter conditional
plea).
1364. FED. R. CRIM. P. I1(a)(2).
1365. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(2); see U.S. v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1987) (rule 11
violated by government's failure to disclose to court that codefendants' pleas depended on
defendant's plea; district court should have allowed defendant to withdraw plea); U.S. v.
Blackner, 721 F.2d 703, 708 (10th Cir. 1983) (rule 11 violated by failure to disclose to judge
agreement that government would not recommend specific sentence). Cf. U.S. v. White, 583 F.2d
819, 824 n.1 (6th Cir. 1978) (plea must be disclosed on record and disclosure under rule 11 should
take place at time plea entered). But cf. U.S. v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 249-50 (4th Cir.)
(government's agreement to make limited oral and written statements of facts to court not
material term of plea agreement, and thus did not need to be disclosed to court when guilty plea
entered), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991).
1366. FED. R. CRIM. P. II(e)(3); see U.S. v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1986) (within
court's discretion to reasonably reject plea contrary to "sound administration of justice"), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987); U.S. v. Greener, 979 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1992) (within court's
discretion to reject first two plea agreements between defendant and government when it
determined that the agreements did not adequately present defendant's criminal conduct and
would therefore undermine the sentencing guidelines); U.S. v. LeMay, 952 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir.
1991) (per curiam) (within court's discretion to reject plea agreement because agreement
provided for lenient sentence); U.S. v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1461-62 (10th Cir. 1985) (within
court's discretion to reject plea agreement as too lenient when government agreed both to
recommend specific sentence and dismiss charge); cf. U.S. v. Lewis, 979 F.2d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir.
1992) (Although plea bargain is governed by contract principles, the court is not a party to the
agreement and may reject it).
It is unclear whether rule 11 requires a trial court to state specific reasons for rejecting a guilty
plea. Compare U.S. v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1990) (although court has broad
discretion in deciding whether to accept plea agreement, it must articulate its reasons for
rejecting plea; court did not adequately articulate reasons with mere expression of displeasure
that agreement not filed until day of trial) and U.S. v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1983)
(judge must consider each case individually and delineate reasons in record for rejecting plea)
with U.S. v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1986) (rule 11 does not establish criteria for
acceptance or rejection of pleas), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987) and U.S. v. Moore, 637 F.2d
1194, 1196 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (rule 11 does not require court to explain reasons for
rejecting plea agreements).
1367. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2); see U.S. v. Ewing, 957 F.2d 115, 118-19 (4th Cir.) (court may
accept plea and defer accepting agreement until after reviewing presentencing report), cert.
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defendant that she may then withdraw the plea, 369 and that if the plea is not
withdrawn, a less favorable sentence than that contemplated in the plea
agreement may be imposed.3 70 If the agreement calls for the prosecutor to
recommend, or not to oppose the defendant's request for, a particular sen-
tence, the recommendation is not binding on the court. 3 "1 The court must
explain to the defendant that the court is not bound by the sentencing
recommendation and that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if
the court chooses not to accept the recommendation.'3 7 2
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3008 (1992); U.S. v. Kemper, 908 F.2d 33, 36-37 (6th Cir. 1990) (judge's initial
acceptance contingent upon presentence report and therefore within court's discretion later to
reject plea when presentence report revealed incorrect stipulation concerning drug quantity on
which plea based); cfI. U.S. v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 114-15 (1st Cir. 1983) (court could not reject
plea on basis of presentence report after unconditional acceptance of plea); U.S. v. Skidmore,
998 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1993) (when district court fails to indicate status of plea agreement as
required by rule 11(e)(2), acceptance of guilty plea operates as acceptance of the agreement);
U.S. v. Salva, 902 F.2d 483, 488 (7th Cir. 1990) (court shall defer decision to accept or reject until
consideration of presentence report unless report not required under Sentencing Guidelines).
1368. See U.S. v. Muzika, 986 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1993) (court cannot both reject
agreement and hold government to its promise within agreement to dismiss remaining counts
against defendant).
1369. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(4); see U.S. v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1105 (7th Cir. 1986) (if
court rejects plea, rule 11(e)(4) guarantees defendant right to withdraw plea), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1038 (1987); U.S. v. Walker, 927 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1991) (if court rejects initial plea
agreement, it may allow defendant to withdraw guilty plea and enter new plea agreement); U.S.
v. Fernandez, 960 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (court erred by failing either to accept
plea agreement as submitted or reject agreement and allow defendant to withdraw plea); cf. U.S.
v. Babineau, 795 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1986) (when plea agreement requires government to
recommend particular sentence, failure of court to follow such recommendation does not
constitute rejection of plea and rule 11(e)(4) inapplicable); U.S. v. Otte, 729 F.2d 1207, 1208 (9th
Cir. 1984) (when defendant knew court not required to accept sentence agreed upon by state as
appropriate, court's failure to admonish defendant mere technical violation of rule 11).
1370. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(4).
1371. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2); see U.S. v. Bennett, 990 F.2d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1993)
(defendant not permitted to withdraw guilty plea when court properly complied with requirement
of Rule 11(e)(2) by informing defendant that sentencing recommendations were not binding on
the court and that defendant could not withdraw his guilty plea under any circumstances).
1372. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(B), (e)(2); see U.S. v. Ferrara, 954 F.2d 103, 106-08 (2d Cir.
1992) (reversible error when trial court failed to tell defendant he could not withdraw guilty plea
if court rejected prosecutor's sentencing recommendation); U.S. v. laquinta, 719 F.2d 83, 85 (4th
Cir. 1983) (same); U.S. v. Theron, 849 F.2d 477, 480-81 (10th Cir. 1988) (same); U.S. v. Zickert,
955 F.2d 665, 668 (11th Cir. 1992) (same).
The failure of the court to inform a defendant of her inability to withdraw a plea if the
prosecutor's recommendation is rejected can amount to harmless error. See U.S. v. de le Puente,
755 F.2d 313, 314-15 (3d Cir.) (harmless error when court failed to inform defendant he had no
right to withdraw plea if court rejected prosecutor's recommendation because no likelihood that
defendant labored under misapprehension that plea could be withdrawn), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1005 (1985); U.S. v. Thibodeaux, 811 F.2d 847, 847-48 (5th Cir.) (harmless error when judge
failed to inform defendant that court did not have to abide by sentence recommendation in plea
agreement because judge essentially conveyed idea), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1008 (1987); U.S. v.
DeCicco, 899 F.2d 1531, 1534-35 (7th Cir. 1990) (no reversible error when judge failed to inform
defendant he could not withdraw plea because plea agreement clearly stated court not bound by
sentence recommendation, defendant could not withdraw plea, and defendant capable of reading
and understanding agreement) and Lilly v. U.S., 792 F.2d 1541, 1544-45 (11th Cir. 1986)
(harmless error when court failed to warn defendant he would not be able to withdraw plea even
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Rule 11 establishes the guidelines federal courts must follow to ensure that
a guilty plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. 373 Pursuant to rule 11, the
judge must address the defendant in open court1374 before accepting a guilty
plea.'375 Rule 11 also requires the judge to inform the defendant of and to
though form of guilty plea suggested plea could be withdrawn because no actual prejudice shown)
with U.S. v. DeBusk, 976 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1992) (not harmless error when district court
failed to explain to defendant pursuant to Rule ll(e)(2) that he would have no right to withdraw
his plea if court rejected the government's sentencing recommendations). Furthermore, when the
government has not agreed to either recommend a specific sentence or refrain from opposing the
defendant's request for a particular sentence, the court is not required to warn the defendant
that she cannot withdraw her plea. U.S. v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1992) (court not
required to inform defendant that he could not withdraw plea after pleading guilty).
When circumstances require, courts have some discretion in permitting the withdrawal of a
guilty plea. See U.S. v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 326-27 (3d Cir. 1991) (court permitted defendant to
withdraw guilty plea when unexpected legal issue arose and sentence reflected that unexpected
change).
Failure to comply with Rule 11(e)(2) will not merit collateral relief under § 2255 except under
exceptional circumstances. See Rogers v. U.S., 1 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 1993) (trial court's error
in failing to advise defendant that sentencing guideline not binding on the court and that
defendant would have no right to withdraw plea in any case did not entitle defendant to § 2255
relief). For further discussion of this issue, see HABEAS RELIEF FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS in Part V.
1373. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c),(d). Rule 11 is not constitutionally mandated. McCarthy v. U.S.,
394 U.S. 459, 464-65 (1969). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court exercises its supervisory powers
over the federal courts to enforce the rule because it assists trial courts in making the constitution-
ally required determination of voluntariness. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, thus has become the standard
by which most federal courts evaluate voluntariness. See Marquis v. U.S., 698 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.
1983) (collateral attack on plea as involuntary not sustained when requirements of rule 11
satisfied). The government has the burden of proving compliance with rule 11 when the defen-
dant challenges a plea unless the record of the plea hearing clearly reflects that the guidelines
were followed. U.S. v. Goodheim, 651 F.2d 1294, 1298-99 (9th Cir. 1981). Similar concerns can be
raised in a federal challenge to state court proceedings. See Heiser v. Ryan, 951 F.2d 559, 562-63
(3d Cir. 1991) (federal hearing necessary to determine whether plea voluntary or due process
violated after long delay in state court).
The defendant should consult with an attorney before a judge allows the defendant to plead
guilty. See U.S. v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (decision to plead must be
made only after consulting with attorney). But cf. U.S. v. Pregler, 925 F.2d 268, 269 (8th Cir.
1991) (mere lack of counsel when defendant entered plea agreement not grounds for setting
aside knowing and voluntary plea).
1374. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c). Compare U.S. v. Scully, 798 F.2d 411, 413 (10th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (guilty plea invalid when trial judge relied solely on personal recollection to establish
that plea made voluntarily and nothing in record indicated that judge addressed defendant) with
U.S. v. Samuels, 726 F.2d 389, 389-90 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (guilty plea valid because mere
technical violation when court at plea hearing allowed prosecutor and defense attorney to
question defendant about understanding of charges because they did adequate job of ensuring
voluntariness, defendant well-educated, and judge addressed her before accepting plea) and U.S.
v. Cooper, 725 F.2d 756, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (guilty plea valid when court relied
on attorney to enumerate rights waived by defendant and record reflected defendant under-
stood).
1375. The trial court may reject a guilty plea and direct that a plea of not guilty be entered. See
U.S. v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1986) (guilty plea properly rejected when court
believed defendant untruthful), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987); cf. McKenzie v. Risley, 842
F.2d 1525, 1536-37 n.25 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant's guilty plea to lesser crime rejected by
prosecutor and court because kidnapping and murder victim's family opposed such plea bargain-
ing), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).
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ensure the defendant understands: (1) the nature of the charge; 376 (2) the
mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for the charge,'" including
1376. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(c)(l). When explaining the charge to the defendant, the court must
consider both the complexity of the charge and the sophistication of the defendant. Compare
Panuccio v. Kelly, 927 F.2d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1991) (plea valid and defendant not entitled to
relief when defendant informed of nature of charges and elements of crimes, although defendant
not informed of affirmative defense); U.S. v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1989) (plea
valid and defendant not entitled to relief when no showing he would have changed plea upon
more precise explanation of charge); U.S. v. Stephens, 906 F.2d 251, 253-54 (6th Cir. 1990) (plea
valid when defendant adequately informed of charge and plea results even if defendant unaware
of specific Guidelines range at time pleaded); U.S. v. Lumpkins, 845 F.2d 1444, 1449 (7th Cir.
1988) (plea valid when court engaged in painstakingly detailed colloquy with poorly educated,
inarticulate defendant regarding his alleged mailing of threatening letters); Moore v. Armont-
rout, 928 F.2d 288, 291-92 (8th Cir. 1991) (plea valid when defendant informed of elements of
crime although defendant did not have necessary penetration required for rape conviction) and
Dismuke v. U.S., 864 F.2d 106, 107 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (plea valid despite failure to
inform defendant that he could raise good faith exception; nothing in rule 11 requires trial judge
to inform defendant of every possible defense) with Valencia v. U.S., 923 F.2d 917, 921-23 (1st
Cir. 1991) (plea invalid when defendant had minimal formal education, little familiarity with
American legal system, and requested, but did not receive, explanation of complicated jurisdic-
tion issue); U.S. v. Shacklett, 921 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (plea invalid when
court entirely failed to inquire whether defendant understood nature of charges even though
defendant received copy of information and stated had ample time to review it); U.S. v. Syal, 963
F.2d 900, 903-06 (6th Cir. 1992) (plea invalid when court failed to advise defendant of elements
of offense or terms of supervised release); Nevarez-Diaz v. U.S., 870 F.2d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 1989)(plea invalid when court failed to ensure defendant understood both nature of crime and that
mere presence at scene of crime insufficient to establish guilt) and U.S. v. Kamer, 781"F.2d 1380,
1384-85 (9th Cir.) (plea invalid when court failed to make thorough inquiry into defendant's
understanding of complex charges, despite defendant's above-average intelligence), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 819 (1986).
A defendant is not entitled to relief if there is no showing that she would have changed her
plea upon a more precise explanation of the charge. U.S. v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1005-06 (5th
Cir. 1989); see also U.S. v. Daniel, 866 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1989) (failure to advise defendant
as to nature of conspiracy charge did not violate rule 11 when defendant did not plead guilty to
that charge); U.S. v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59-60 (D.C. Cir.) (failure to inform defendant of
special parole terms and minor omission in explaining elements of charge did not affect validity of
plea), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 942 (1990).
1377. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). This requirement is constitutionally based. Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969) (defendant constitutionally entitled to know range of
sentences); see U.S. v. Johnson, 983 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir.) (court's failure to advise defendant of
mandatory minimum sentence was failure to address rule I 1 core concern, mandating that plea
be set aside); U.S. v. Elmendorf, 945 F.2d 989, 992-94 (7th Cir. 1991) (court required to inform
defendant of minimum and maximum sentencing possibilities but not required to inform defen-
dant of likely sentence), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 990 (1992); U.S. v. Hourihan, 936 F.2d 508,509-11
(11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (court's failure to inform defendant of mandatory five-year
minimum sentence until after plea hearing entitled defendant to withdraw plea when agreement
reflected that defendant and government contemplated considerably shorter sentence). But cf.
U.S. v. Saenz, 969 F.2d 294, 295-98 (7th Cir. 1992) (court's error in warning defendant about
mandatory minimum sentence did not permit defendant to withdraw guilty plea); U.S. v. Young,
927 F.2d 1060, 1061-63 (8th Cir.) (failure of district court to advise defendant of statutory
maximum and minimum sentences harmless error when evidence indicated defendant knew of
possible sentence range), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 384 (1991); U.S. v. Johnson, 973 F.2d 857, 859-61
(10th Cir. 1992) (government failure before plea agreement to inform defendant of its intention
to seek mandatory minimum sentence based on his three previous felonies did not violate due
process or equal protection rights when government did not know sentence enhancement would
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special parole term or supervised release terms 37 8 and the possibility of
restitution to victims; 3 9 (3) the various constitutional waivers associated with
apply until presentence report reflected prior felonies, and defendant was given opportunity to
withdraw plea).
The courts apply a flexible approach in determining what information a defendant must receive
about sentencing possibilities under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d
111, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1991) (court must tell defendant about maximum possible sentence and that
Sentencing Guidelines apply, but need not explain how Guidelines apply); U.S. v. Henry, 893
F.2d 46, 48-49 (3d Cir. 1990) (court not required under rule 11 to advise defendant of bottom end
of Sentencing Guidelines range for offenses); U.S. v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117-19 (4th Cir.
1991) (court not required to inform defendant of Sentencing Guidelines range before defendant
pleaded guilty), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1703 (1992); U.S. v. Tuangmaneeratmun, 925 F.2d 797,
804-05 (5th Cir. 1991) (court not required to calculate and explain Sentencing Guidelines
sentence prior to accepting guilty plea); U.S. v. Thomas, 894 F.2d 996, 997 (8th Cir.) (per curiam)
(court not required under rule 11 to inform defendant of Sentencing Guidelines range or actual
sentence when accepting plea), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 909 (1990); U.S. v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 752
(9th Cir.) (court not required under rule 11 to inform defendant of Sentencing Guidelines career
offender provision when accepting plan), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 986 (1990); U.S. v. Wright, 930
F.2d 808, 810 (10th Cir. 1991) (court required under rule 11 to inform defendant of "possible
penalty," which includes both length of incarceration and amount of fine including potential
alternative fines, but failure to inform defendant of potential alternative fines harmless error
when defendant failed to show such knowledge would have changed decision to plead). A plea is
invalid if a defendant relies on the judge's materially inaccurate statement about the Sentencing
Guidelines. U.S. v. Story, 891 F.2d 988, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1989); see Rodriguera v. U.S., 954 F.2d
1465, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1992) (plea vacated because defendant could have been given longer
sentence than court advised him).
1378. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). A violation of this rule, like any violation of rule 11 not
affecting substantial rights, may amount to harmless error. Compare U.S. v. Gracia, 983 F.2d 625,
628 (5th Cir. 1993) (harmless error when court understated by one year the minimum potential
term of supervised release) and U.S. v. Clay, 925 F.2d 299, 302-04 (9th Cir. 1991) (harmless error
when court failed to inform defendant of possibility of supervised release term because combina-
tion of sentence and supervised release less than maximum possible sentence of which defendant
informed at plea hearing) with U.S. v. Hekimain, 975 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1992) (not
harmless error when court both gave erroneous advice regarding effect of violations of supervised
release and failed to advise defendant the court had ability to make upward departure from
sentencing guidelines range); U.S. v. Syal, 963 F.2d 900, 903-06 (6th Cir. 1992) (court's failure to
notify defendant about supervised release term not harmless error when defendant faced possible
restraints on liberty beyond advised maximum penalty) and Rodriguera v. U.S., 954 F.2d 1465,
1468-69 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).
1379. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). Compare U.S. v. Khan, 857 F.2d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1988)
(court's failure to inform defendant of possibility of $266,000 restitution it later ordered not
harmless when maximum actually $1,000 and not cured by earlier statement that maximum
$250,000), cer. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991); U.S. v. Corn, 836 F.2d 889, 895-96 (5th Cir. 1988)
(court's lailure to mention $6 million restitution it later ordered not harmless error even though
court told defendant it could impose any sentence short of death; court must either accept
withdrawal of guilty plea or resentence defendant without restitution penalty) and U.S. v. Pogue,
865 F.2d 226, 228-30 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (court's failure to mention possibility of
$1,758,091.14 fine not harmless error even though court mentioned possibility of $2,000 fine;
court must either resentence without restitution, vacate conviction and allow defendant to
withdraw plea, or conduct further hearings to determine when defendant made aware of possibil-
ity and if understood could withdraw plea at that time) with U.S. v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461,465-66
(4th Cir. 1986) (failure to inform defendant of possibility of restitution harmless error because
maximum fine approximately same amount as possible restitution and defendant informed of
serious financial repercussions) and U.S. v. Peden, 872 F.2d 1303, 1307-10 (7th Cir. 1989) (failure
to inform defendant of possibility of restitution harmless error when record revealed defendant
aware of such possibility).
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a guilty plea;.3 . and (4) that answers to the court's questions may be used
against her in a subsequent proceeding if under oath, on the record, and in the
presence of defendant's counsel.' 31' The court need not, however, inform the
defendant of any collateral consequences of the plea. 382
Rule 11(d) further requires the court to ensure the guilty plea is not the
result of force, threats, 38 3 or promises apart from the plea agreement.
3 84
1380. FED. R. CGRIM. P. 11(c)(3)-(4). A violation of this rule may amount to harmless error. See
U.S. v. Stead, 746 F.2d 355, 356-57 (6th Cir. 1984) (failure of court to advise defendant of
privilege against self-incrimination and right to confrontation harmless error when court made
meticulous effort to ensure defendant understood consequences of plea), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1030 (1985); U.S. v. Lovett, 844 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1988) (failure of court to advise defendant
of right to plead not guilty not reversible error when court discussed jury trial and attached rights
that guilty plea would foreclose); U.S. v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (10th Cir. 1990)
(failure of court to advise defendant of right to confront and cross-examine witnesses harmless
error when defendant's plea voluntary and defendant understood nature of charges against him).
1381. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5); see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a) (prior statements of party not
hearsay when used against that party in proceeding). A violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5) can
be harmless error. See U.S. v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521, 1526 (10th Cir. 1990) (failure to
warn defendant at plea hearing that statements could be used in perjury trial harmless error
when defendant did not face prosecution for perjury and did not demonstrate other prejudice
might result); U.S. v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 1566, 1569 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (failure to warn
defendant at plea hearing that statements could be used in perjury trial not basis for attack of
plea absent threat of perjury prosecution or showing of prejudice).
1382. See U.S. v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1991) (no need to inform defendant that
guilty plea in state prosecution could be used against him in subsequent federal prosecution);
U.S. v. Olvera, 954 F.2d 788, 793-94 (2d Cir.) (no need to inform defendant of possible
deportation because collateral consequence of guilty plea; judge's invalid deportation order
constituted harmless error), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3011 (1992); U.S. v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d
177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (no need to inform defendant of potential deportation because collateral
consequence unrelated to length or nature of sentence); U.S. v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7-8 (4th
Cir. 1988) (no need to inform defendant that guilty plea would lead to deportation); Johnson v.
Puckett, 930 F.2d 445, 448 n.2 (5th Cir.) (no need to inform defendant that guilty plea would
affect his "good time" credits), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 252 (1991); U.S. v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310,
1317-18 (7th Cir.) (no need to inform defendant of possibility of federal prosecution because not
direct consequence of state guilty plea or one over which state's attorney had control), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 831 (1989); George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110-11 (8th Cir. 1984) (no need in
state court to inform defendant of mandatory mental health commitment proceedings after
release from prison when commitment not automatic, definite, or immediate); Varela v. Kaiser,
976 F.2d 1357, 1357 (10th Cir. 1992) (no need for defense counsel to warn his alien client that he
will likely be deported if pleads guilty), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1869 (1993); Holmes v. U.S., 876
F.2d 1545, 1548-50 (11th Cir. 1989) (no need to inform defendant of ineligibility for parole under
CCE statute because collateral rather than direct consequence of guilty plea); U.S. v. Del
Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59-60 (D.C. Cir.) (no need to inform defendant of possible deportation
because no effect on validity of plea), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 352 (1990); cf. Wellman v. Maine,
962 F.2d 70, 72-73 (Ist Cir. 1992) (plea voluntary despite retraction of previously awarded credit
against sentence); Brown v. Perini, 718 F.2d 784, 787-88 (6th Cir. 1983) (plea voluntary even
though defendant misinformed as to parole eligibility because collateral consequence of which
defendant need not be informed at all).
1383. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d). See Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (dictum). But see
U.S. v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1385 (5th Cir.) (plea voluntary despite threats to charge defendant
with other offenses to induce guilty plea), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); U.S. v. Daniels, 902
F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir.) (plea voluntary despite fact prisoner, released from solita.ry confine-
ment shortly after pleading guilty), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (990); U.S. v. Dalman, 994 F.2d
537, 539 (8th Cir. 1993) (plea voluntary when court informed defendant of fact that pleading not
guilty would necessitate continued detention for the weekend).
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Prosecutorial misconduct may render a defendant's resulting plea void for
involuntariness. 1385 To prove involuntariness, the defendant must show that
fear of the possible consequences of not pleading guilty destroyed her ability
to balance the risks and benefits of going to trial. 138 6 In Bordenkircher v.
Hayes,138 7 the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's threats to reindict the
defendant on more severe charges if the defendant refused to plead guilty to
the original indictment did not render the defendant's plea involuntary.' 388
Although plea bargains that provide help to family members and friends impose special
responsibility on the court to determine voluntariness, it is not necessarily unlawful coercion for
the prosecution to threaten to indict or prosecute a relative of the defendant if such relative
could be or has been properly indicted. See U.S..v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, 1000 & n.6 (1st Cir.
1988) (threatened prosecution of defendant's brother did not render defendant's plea involuntary
as matter of law), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1015 (1989); U.S. v. Contractor, 926 F.2d 128, 133 (2d
Cir.) (threat that codefendant "would suffer" unless defendant pleaded guilty did not render plea
involuntary), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 123 (1991); U.S. v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 374-79 (5th Cir. 1984)
(threatened prosecution of defendant's brother and sister-in-law did not render plea involuntary
when probable cause to bring such charges); Bontkowski v. U.S., 850 F.2d 306, 313 (7th Cir. 1988)
(threatened prosecution of defendant's pregnant wife to fullest extent of law when wife already
indicted could not support claim that plea coerced); Martin v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244, 1247-48
(11th Cir. 1985) (threatened prosecution of defendant's wife did not render plea involuntary
when probable cause to indict wife).
1384. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1I(d).
1385. Compare Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1321-22 (2d Cir.) (murder defendant allowed
to challenge guilty plea when prosecution withheld exculpatory, material evidence that another
man seen near victims and arrested for assault), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988) with U.S. v.
Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir.) (defendant not allowed to challenge guilty plea when
prosecution failed to alert defendant to possible federal prosecution because not prosecutorial
misconduct), cer. denied, 493 U.S. 831 (1989); White v. U.S., 858 F.2d 416, 420-24 (8th Cir. 1988)
(defendant not allowed to challenge guilty plea when prosecutor failed to reveal key witness's
inconsistent deposition testimony and that government investigator intended to use witness's
burglary arrest to influence cooperation; such failure not prosecutorial misconduct and did not
render plea involuntary when court found that defendant knew of witness's lack of credibility and
that such information would not have altered decision to plead guilty), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1029
(1989) and U.S. v. Vargas, 925 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 1991) (defendant not allowed to
challenge guilty plea when government failed to move for downward departure because unable to
prove sufficient government bad faith).
1386. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51 (guilty plea not coerced by fear of death penalty under
kidnapping statute, even though Supreme Court subsequently ruled death penalty provision of
statute unconstitutional); see Jones v. Estelle, 584 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1978) (guilty plea not
coerced by attorney's impatience or fear of greater punishment); U.S. v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238,
1243 (7th Cir.) (guilty plea not coerced by judge's statements reflecting leniency toward defen-
dants who admit guilt when no extravagant promise made regarding leniency), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 981 (1990); Hale v. Lockhart, 903 F.2d 545, 550-51 (8th Cir. 1990) (guilty plea not coerced
even if entered into to avoid death penalty when court determined plea made voluntarily and
intelligently); Gano v. U.S., 705 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1983) (guilty plea not coerced by
judge's remark that defendant would likely be found guilty on 20 counts); Bailey v. Cowley, 914
F,2d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (guilty plea not coerced by fear of prosecution
using prior conviction against defendant).
1387. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
1388. Id. at 360-63. In Hayes, the prosecutor threatened to indict the defendant under the
recidivist statute which would result in a life sentence if he did not plead guilty. Id. at 358-59. The
defendant pleaded not guilty and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 359. In
holding that a prosecutor may bring more severe charges than originally contemplated when a
defendant refuses to accept a plea bargain, the Court reasoned that the defendant was fully
informed of the prosecutor's intention and made a knowing and voluntary decision to reject the
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A defendant may also challenge a guilty plea on the ground that ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial prevented the defendant from entering a knowing
and voluntary plea. 13 8 9 In Hill v. Lockhart13 9 1 the Supreme Court held that, to
set aside a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show: (1) her counsel's assistance was not "within the range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases";' 3 1' and (2) a reasonable
probability that she would not have pleaded guilty with competent counsel. 392
plea bargain. Id. at 360-63; see U.S. v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1385 (5th Cir.) (no due process
violation despite threats to charge defendant with other offenses to induce him to enter guilty
plea), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); cf. U.S. v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(defendant's right to jury trial not unconstitutionally burdened by district court's addition of six
months to defendant's sentence, imposed solely because defendant went to trial instead of
pleading guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt), vacated in part, 980 F.2d 746, reh'g
granted, 997 F.2d 1475 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 741 (1994).
Several earlier Supreme Court cases similarly failed to find involuntariness. See Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 792, 794-95 (1970) (plea voluntary although induced by statute providing
that defendants pleading guilty to capital crimes would not be subject to death penalty); McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771-72 (1970) (plea voluntary although induced by earlier coerced
confession); Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (plea voluntary even if motivated by desire to accept certain
sentence rather than face wide range of possibilities).
Coercion by private sources usually does not invalidate the voluntariness of a guilty plea unless
such private conduct is attributable to or sanctioned by the prosecution. See LoConte v. Dugger,
847 F.2d 745, 753 (11th Cir.) (pressure from friends to plead guilty did not invalidate plea
because prosecution neither knew of nor sanctioned their behavior), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958
(1988); cf. U.S.v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1988) (reliance on advice of civil attorney
in criminal case did not invalidate plea; defendant cannot challenge plea simply because followed
advice of someone other than criminal attorney). But see Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866-67 (9th
Cir. 1986) (attorney's threat to withdraw from case and brother's threat to take away bail
rendered guilty plea involuntary despite lack of government coercion).
1389. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). See Lopez-Nieves v. U.S., 917 F.2d
645, 650 (1st Cir. 1990) (plea not involuntary despite counsel's failure to request psychiatric
evaluation to determine defendant's competency to plead because defendant's sworn statement
confirmed defendant not under influence of drugs at plea hearing); Panuccio v. Kelly, 927 F.2d
106, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1991) (plea not involuntary despite counsel's failure to inform defendant of
possible intoxication defense because defense not likely to be successful); Chichakly'v. U.S., 926
F.2d 624, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1991) (plea not involuntary despite counsel's misprediction of 90-day
sentence although sentence four years); Wiles v. Jones, 960 F.2d 751, 753 (8th Cir.) (plea not
involuntary for ineffective assistance of counsel when defendant pleaded guilty because attorney
warned him of likelihood of death penalty), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 423 (1992); Osborn v.
Shillinger, 997 F.2d 1324, 1328 (10th Cir. 1993) (plea not involuntary despite counsel's failure to
appeal interlocutory ruling allowing state to pursue death penalty when defendant failed to
demonstrate prejudice); Jones v. White, 992 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir.) (plea not involuntary
when counsel acted in good faith in advising defendant to plead guilty because counsel did.not
feel he could provide believable defense given lack of alibi and numerous eyewitness identifica-
tions), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 448 (1993).
1390. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
1391. Id. at 56 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). See Brady, 397 U.S. at
757-58 (guilty plea voluntary and intelligent when defendant received competent advice from
counsel as to possibility of receiving death penalty if convicted at trial).
1392. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59. Compare U.S. v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 1993) (plea
not involuntary when counsel failed to advise defendant of constitutional right to indictment
when failure was not "but-for" cause of defendant's guilty plea); Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d
926, 933 (7th Cir. 1991) (guilty plea voluntary and not coerced even though attorneys strongly
encouraged defendant to plead guilty against his will), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3002 (1992) and
Long v. U.S., 883 F.2d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1989) (guilty plea voluntary despite attorney's
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A defendant claiming ineffective assistance must overcome a strong presump-
tion of reliability of her in-court statements, made when the plea was entered,
concerning the voluntariness of the plea and her satisfaction with her attorney's
performance. 1
393
Finally, rule 11 requires a federal court to ensure there is a factual basis for
a guilty plea. 394 The court should make such inquiries as are necessary to
verify that the act to which the defendant admits is the offense with which she
is charged. 139 5 If the court finds an insufficient factual basis for the guilty plea,
overstatement of prison term because no evidence defendant would have changed plea if
prediction of sentence proper) with Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (8th Cir.) (en banc)
(guilty plea involuntary because defense counsel's erroneous parole eligibility advice dispositive
of defendant's decision to plead), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011 (1990). Ineffective assistance of
counsel and attorney conflict of interest are discussed in RIGHT TO COUNSEL in Part Ill.
1393. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) ("Solemn declarations in open court
carry a strong presumption of verity."); U.S. v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991)
(substantial weight attached to contemporaneous statements on record in assessing voluntariness
of pleas).
1394. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f). A judge should independently assess the factual basis for a plea.
U.S. v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1125 (11th Cir. 1990).
1395. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f). The factual basis requirement protects a defendant from
pleading voluntarily without realizing that her conduct is not actually within the charge. McCar-
thy, 394 U.S. at 467. The government need not present uncontroverted evidence of guilt, but
rather evidence from which a court could reasonably find that the defendant is guilty. Compare
Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1992) (adequate factual basis to accept plea because
defendant's indication that stabbing occurred during fight did not require court inquiry into
possible self defense claim); U.S. v. Guichard, 779 F.2d 1139, 1146 (5th Cir.) (adequate factual
basis to accept plea when defendant agreed to and signed recitation of events), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1127 (1986); U.S. v. Alvarez-Quiroga, 901 F.2d 1433, 1438-39 (7th Cir.) (adequate factual
basis to accept plea even though defendant did not acknowledge truth of all facts essential to
proving guilt at trial), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 203 (1990); Neal v. Grammer, 975 F.2d 463, 466 (8th
Cir. 1992) (adequate factual basis to accept defendant's guilty plea notwithstanding defendant's
hesitancy and confusion in deciding whether to enter the plea); U.S. v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d
1184, 1189 (9th Cir.) (adequate factual basis to accept guilty plea when evidence supported
inference that defendant guilty), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 258 (1992) and U.S. v. Lopez, 907 F.2d
1096, 1100-01 (11th Cir. 1990) (adequate factual basis to accept plea in facts asserted in
government's opening statement, testimony of government witnesses, and information disclosed
in plea hearing) with U.S. v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1988) (no adequate factual
basis when government could not prove fourth element of misprision of felony); Montgomery v.
U.S., 853 F.2d 83, 85 (7th Cir. 1988) (no adequate factual basis when conspiracy essential
element of crime charged and defendant's admissions and evidence pointed only to plans to sell
drugs to unknown individual purchasers); U.S. v. Bigman, 906 F.2d 392, 394-95 (9th Cir. 1990)
(no adequate factual basis when trial court failed to establish on record defendant's understand-
ing of intent element of crime to which plea entered) and U.S. v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992, 996-98
(10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (no adequate factual basis when record failed to reflect clearly
evidence upon which trial court relied to find defendant possessed requisite intent for crime of
conversion).
The trial court exercises wide discretion in determining whether a factual basis exists. See U.S.
v. Lumpkins, 845 F.2d 1444, 1451 (7th Cir. 1988) (within court's discretion to determine whether
letters written by defendant within statute of limitations period and could form factual basis of
plea); U.S. v. Lopez, 907 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (11th Cir. 1990) (within court's discretion to
consider facts in government statement and from government's witnesses along with facts from
plea hearing sufficient to form factual basis for plea to RICO charge). But cf. U.S. v. Keiswetter,
866 F.2d 1301, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 1989) (not within trial court's discretion to order remand to
clarify court's reasons for factual basis if not clear from record; instead, plea should be vacated).
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a plea of not guilty will be entered. 39" If the defendant enters a plea of guilty
while continuing to assert her innocence, the plea will be accepted if there is
strong evidence of guilt."397 The court must keep a verbatim record of the plea
proceedings"398 containing the court's advice to the defendant, the voluntari-
ness inquiry, the details of the plea agreement, and the factual accuracy
inquiry.
1399
To set aside a guilty plea, a defendant must show that a violation of rule 11
led to actual prejudice; procedural deviations from the rule that constitute
harmless error will not provide a basis for relief. 14 1
Even without an adequate factual basis, a guilty plea may still be upheld. U.S. v. Adams, 961
F.2d 505, 510-12 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (trial court accepted guilty plea without adequate
factual basis but error harmless).
1396. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(f) advisory committee's note (1966 amendment).
1397. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (plea accepted when defendant
pleaded guilty to second-degree murder on advice of counsel despite protestations of innocence;
court found "overwhelming evidence" of guilt). Although rule 11 does not directly address the
issue of an Alford plea, such pleas are treated similar to the nolo contendere plea and accepted
only if acceptance is in the interest of effective administration of justice. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (f)
advisory committee's note (1974 amendment). See U.S. v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 611-12 (4th Cir.
1990) (strong factual basis required to accept Alford plea; satisfied in context of RICO conspiracy
action by showing that defendant possessed knowledge of essential nature of conspiracy); U.S. v.
Punch, 709 F.2d 889, 895-97 (5th Cir. 1983) (essential that court accepting Alford plea ensure
defendant understands consequences; Alford plea involuntary when defendant not properly
informed of charge and maintained innocence throughout proceedings).
1398. FED. R. CRIM. P. I1(g).
1399. Id. Compare Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (knowing and voluntary waiver
of constitutional right not presumed from silent record) and U.S. v. Rosillo, 853 F.2d 1062,
1066-67 (2dCir. 1988) (failure to make on-record determination of voluntariness, given defendant's
admitted use of medication, constituted reversible error) with U.S. v. Alvarez-Quiroga, 901 F.2d
1433, 1437 (7th Cir.) (involuntariness not shown when court held full and careful hearing), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 203 (1990).
This record is used in the event of a subsequent attack on the plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(g)
advisory committee's note (1974 amendment). See U.S. v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383-84 (9th
Cir.) (appellate court looks only to record of plea hearing to determine validity of plea, not to
entire proceeding), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986). The loss of the verbatim transcript, however,
does not necessitate a finding of involuntariness at a subsequent challenge to the plea. For
example, in a subsequent prosecution for recidivism, the Court has held that a state may apply a
presumption that the guilty plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily even though the
record of the original plea proceeding is not available. Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992).
1400. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (h) ("Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). Rule 1 1(h) abrogates the portion of
McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459 (1969), that held a failure to adhere fully to the requirements of
rule 11 mandates the plea be set aside. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h) advisory committee's note. See
U.S. v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 785 (1979) (formal or technical violations of rule I1 do not
warrant collateral relief if defendant does not show he would have pled guilty if violations had
not occurred); U.S. v. Japa, 994 F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir. 1993) (substantial rights not affected when
court failed to ask defendant whether he intended to distribute cocaine within 1000 feet of a
school and only asked if he possessed cocaine, and when prosecutor failed to include reference to
a school in statement of proof).
The 1983 advisory committee's note to rule 11 indicate there are two caveats to the harmless
error doctrine. First, "[the rule] should not be read as supporting extreme or speculative
harmless error claims or as, in effect, nullifying important rule 11 safeguards."FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(h) advisory committee's note. Second, "[the rule] should not be read as an invitation to the
trial court to take a more casual approach to rule I 1 proceedings." Id.
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Withdrawing the Plea. Once a plea has been accepted, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure allow a defendant to withdraw the plea only with the
court's permission.1 41' A motion to withdraw a guilty plea or a plea of nolo
contendere entered prior to sentencing will be granted on a showing of a fair
and just reason.'40 2 A motion to withdraw a plea between tentative and final
1401. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d); see U.S. v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1990) (defendant
has burden of proving valid grounds exist for withdrawing plea), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084
(1991); U.S. v. Rojas, 898 F.2d 40, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1990) (withdrawal of guilty plea left to trial
court's discretion); U.S. v. Savage, 891 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); U.S. v. Casey, 951
F.2d 892, 894-95 (8th Cir. 1991) (no evidentiary hearing necessary on motion to withdraw guilty
plea when allegations in motion unreliable, not supported by specific facts, or insufficient for
withdrawal even if true), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2284 (1992); Robtoy v. Kincheloe, 871 F.2d 1478,
1481-82 (9th Cir. 1989) (no federally guaranteed right to have court accept guilty plea; court's
refusal to allow defendant to alter guilty plea not violation of due process), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1061 (1990); U.S. v. Lake, 709 F.2d 43, 44-45 (11th Cir. 1983) (no abuse of discretion to deny
withdrawal of plea when defendant belatedly discovered possible psychiatric defense to con-
spiracy charge); U.S. v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (plea may not be
withdrawn as matter of right, although withdrawal will be liberally granted before sentencing; no
abuse to deny withdrawal when defendant waited until after codefendant's sentence); cf. U.S. v.
Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir.) ("plea of guilty is a solemn act not to be disregarded
because of belated misgivings about the wisdom of same" (quoting U.S. v. Woosley, 440 F.2d
1280, 1281 (8th Cir. 1971))), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 989 (1990).
1402. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d); U.S. v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir.) (defendant does not
have absolute right to withdraw guilty plea even before sentencing; withdrawal need only be
granted upon showing of fair and just reason), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991); U.S. v. Wade,
940 F.2d 1375, 1377 (10th Cir. 1991) (defendant has burden of demonstrating fair and just reason
for withdrawal of guilty plea). Compare U.S. v. Doyle, 981 F.2d 591, 594-95 (1st Cir. 1992)
(defendant not entitled to withdraw plea despite court's failure to comply with secrecy order
when order came after court had accepted guilty plea and defendant's desire to go to trial
appeared to be based on growing awareness of likely sentence rather than articulated reasons);
U.S. v. Clements, 992 F.2d 417, 419-20 (2d Cir.) (defendant not entitled to withdraw plea despite
government's failure to tell trial court during rule 11 colloquy that plea bargain offered to four
defendants was conditional on all accepting and pleading guilty), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 316
(1993); U.S. v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992) (defendant not entitled to withdraw plea
solely because he feared punishment); U.S. v. Lambey, 974 F.2d. 1389, 1394-96 (4th Cir. 1992)
(defendant not entitled to withdraw plea despite counsel's underestimation of possible sentence
when court clearly and correctly indicated that defendant could receive life sentence, and court
advised defendant not to rely on counsel's estimates); U.S. v. Young, 981 F.2d 180, 184 (5th Cir.
1992) (defendant not entitled to withdraw based on his claims that prosecutor misled him as to
sentence length when defendant fully aware that sentence guideline range could not be predicted
and was directly related to amount of controlled substance involved), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2983
(1993); U.S. v. Head, 927 F.2d 1361, 1375-76 (6th Cir.) (defendant not entitled to withdraw plea
after government gave notice it did not intend to seek downward departure), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 144 (1991); U.S. v. Savage, 891 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir. 1989) (defendant not entitled to
withdraw plea due to dissatisfaction with application of Sentencing Guidelines); U.S. v. Nichols,
986 F.2d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1993) (defendant not entitled to withdraw plea when he relied on
mistaken judgment of counsel that government had strong case against him); U.S. v. Myers, 993
F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant not entitled to withdraw when defendant failed to
produce evidence to support his claim he was incompetent when he made his plea); U.S. v.
Hickok, 907 F.2d 983, 985-86 (10th Cir. 1990) (defendant not entitled to withdraw plea based on
his desire for jury trial) and U.S. v. Abreu, 964 F.2d 16, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(defendant not entitled to withdraw plea based on his tactical reevaluation of strength of
government's case) with U.S. v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 678 (9th Cir.) (defendant entitled to
withdraw plea when codefendants acquitted of same conspiracy charge due to lack of evidence),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986) and U.S. v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
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(defendant entitled to withdraw plea when defendant asserted his legal innocence and his plea
was entered after a substantially defective Rule 11 colloquy where court failed to explain to
defendant nature of charges against him and failed to establish the factual basis of the charges to
which he pled guilty).
Suggested considerations in determining whether a fair and just reason to grant the motion
exists include: (1) whether there has been an assertion of legal innocence or an Alford plea; (2)
the amount of time between the plea and motion (the shorter the interval, the more likely it will
be that the defendant has a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea); and (3) whether the
government would be prejudiced by a withdrawal of the plea (if, for example, the government
discarded physical evidence, dismissed the witnesses, or already tried the codefendant). FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(d) advisory committee's note; see U.S. v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 1992)
(factors include timing of defendant's change of heart, force and plausibility of reason, whether
defendant had asserted legal innocence, whether parties had reached (or breached) plea agree-
ment, and whether defendant's plea can still be regarded as voluntary, intelligent, and otherwise
in conformity with rule 11); U.S. v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1989) (factors include
whether defendant asserted innocence, whether government would be prejudiced, and strength
of defendant's reasons for moving to withdraw); U.S. v. Badger, 925 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1991)(factors include whether defendant asserted innocence, whether withdrawal would prejudice
government, whether and why defendant delayed filing motion, whether withdrawal substantially
inconvenienced court, whether adequate assistance of cbunsel available to defendant, whether
plea knowing and voluntary, and whether withdrawal would waste judicial resources); U.S. v.
Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101, 103-04 (6th Cir. 1988) (factors include whether movant asserted defense
or maintained innocence, length of time between entry of plea and motion to withdraw, why
grounds for withdrawal not presented previously, circumstances underlying entry of plea, i.e.,
background of defendant and whether admitted guilt, and prejudice to government); U.S. v.
Boone, 869 F.2d 1089, 1091-92 (8th Cir.) (factors include whether defendant asserted legal
innocence, length of time between guilty plea and motion to withdraw, and whether government
would be prejudiced), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822 (1989); U.S. v. Elias, 937 F.2d 1514, 1520 (10th
Cir. 1991) (factors include whether defendant asserted innocence, whether withdrawal would
prejudice government, whether and why defendant delayed filing motion, whether withdrawal
substantially inconvenienced court, whether adequate assistance of counsel available to defen-
dant, whether plea knowing and voluntary, and whether withdrawal would waste judicial re-
sources); U.S. v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471-72 (11th Cir. 1988) (factors include whether close
assistance of counsel available, whether plea knowing and voluntary, whether judicial resources
would be conserved, and whether government would be prejudiced), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099
(1989).
If the defendant succeeds in showing a fair and just reason for withdrawing her plea, the
burden shifts to the government to show that it would be prejudiced by the withdrawal. See U.S.
v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (government not required to show prejudice until
defendant shows sufficient grounds for withdrawal of guilty plea); U.S. v. Pitino, 887 F.2d 42, 46
(4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (same); U.S. v. Triplett, 828 F.2d 1195, 1198 (6th Cir. 1987) (same).
At least one court has held that any desire to withdraw is fair as long as the government fails to
show that it would be prejudiced. U.S. v. Savage, 561 F.2d 554,556-57 (4th Cir. 1977) (remand for
defendant to withdraw plea when government cannot show prejudice), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108
(1982). The advisory committee, however, rejected the decision in Satage and suggested that rule
32(d) be interpreted according to the approach taken in Saft, requiring the defendant to first
show a "fair and just" reason for withdrawal before the government is required to show
prejudice. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) advisory committee's note; see U.S. v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111,
114 (3d Cir. 1986) (no abuse of discretion to deny motion to withdraw plea despite lack of
government prejudice, because mere fact government officials spoke to defendant against request
of defense counsel not "fair and just" reason for withdrawal); U.S. v. Haley, 784 F.2d 1218, 1219(4th Cir. 1986) (no abuse of discretion to deny motion despite lack of prejudice to government
when defendant did not show fair and just reason); U.S. v. Benavides, 793 F.2d 612, 616-18 (5th
Cir.) (no abuse of discretion to deny motion when defendant made unsubstantiated claim of
paranoia and intimidation and offered evidence of impairment but did not profess innocence,
even though government not prejudiced), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986); U.S. v. Thompson, 680
F.2d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 1982) (withdrawal of plea not automatic even if government cannot
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show prejudice), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089 (1983); cf. U.S. v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767-68
(11th Cir. 1985) (no abuse of discretion to deny motion to withdraw plea when defendant did not
profess innocence and government would have been prejudiced).
1403. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) advisory committee's note.
1404. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d); see U.S. v. Teller, 762 F.2d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 1985) (rule 32(d)
imposes "near-presumption" against withdrawal after sentencing).
1405. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) advisory committee's note. See U.S. v. Allard, 926 F.2d 1237,
1242-43 (1st Cir. 1991) (no reason to withdraw plea after sentencing when factual allegations,
even if true, no defense and other violations merely technical); U.S. v. Hoskins, 910 F.2d 309, 311
(5th Cir. 1990) (defendant seeking withdrawal of plea after sentencing must show "fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" or "omission inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure") (quoting Hill v. U.S., 368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962))).
Rule 32(d) was amended in 1983 to state that all postsentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas
should be made pursuant to a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Many courts have treated the § 2255
standard of "miscarriage of justice" as identical to the preamendment rule 32(d) standard of
"manifest injustice." U.S. v. Teller, 762 F.2d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 1985). A defendant who seeks to
withdraw her guilty plea after sentencing under rule 32(d) bears the burden of proving the
necessity of such action to correct manifest injustice. Compare U.S. v. O'Hara, 960 F.2d 11, 14
(2d Cir. 1992) (acquittal of coconspirators did not justify withdrawal of guilty plea); U.S. v. Davis,
954 F.2d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1992) (no miscarriage of justice to justify withdrawal of plea
despite defendant's assertion that plea invalid at inception because trial court's nonappealable
ruling precluded effective defense); U.S. v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025, 1030 (6th Cir.) (per curiam)
(no miscarriage of justice to justify withdrawal of plea when defendant's only witness could not
competently testify that alleged promise by counsel that defendant would only receive probation
had actually been made), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2424 (1993); U.S. v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387,
1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (no manifest injustice from denial of motion when court
found that defendant not truthful person and discredited testimony (citing U.S. v. Kay, 537 F.2d
1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1976))), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 825 (1990) and U.S. v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011,
1026-28 (D.C. Cir.) (no manifest injustice even if government allocution violated plea agreement
by going beyond facts and circumstance of crime), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 322 (1992) with U.S. v.
Anderson, 993 F.2d 1435, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant allowed to withdraw plea after
sentencing when district judge imposed unreasonable constraints on defendant such as giving a
short deadline for defendant to decide what to plea, denying new defense counsel additional
preparation time, and threatening to forbid government to accept plea to fewer than all 30
counts).
1406. U.S. v. Zweber, 913 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1990); see U.S. v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d
Cir. 1989) (no abuse of discretion to deny motion to withdraw guilty plea because judge made
independent inquiry as to factual basis, photos depicted defendant with object similar to gun and
defendant rejected offer to plead not guilty after denying possession of gun); U.S. v. Lambert, 994
F.2d 1088, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to permit withdrawal of plea
when court decided to apply much harsher sentencing guideline than government, defendant, or
probation officer had thought applicable, but defendant had testified he understood the length of
sentence he might receive); U.S. v. Clark, 931 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1991) (no abuse of
discretion in refusing to permit withdrawal of plea when over two years had passed and
government would be prejudiced even though defendant's counsel made no independent investiga-
tion before advising defendant to accept plea); U.S. v. Knorr, 942 F.2d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1991)
(no abuse of discretion in refusing to permit withdrawal of plea even though defendant did not
understand he might be subject to increased sentence because of leadership in drug organiza-

